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The non-participatory and participatory aspects of the electoral behaviour of
young British people have attracted considerable attention. The discussion
of young citizens in elections has mostly focused on their chronically low levels of
mobilisation. However, in the context of the General Election 2017, young people
were under the spotlight for different reasons, including the party preference gap
between young and other voters. Differences in youth voting compared to older
voters were also evident in the 2016 Brexit Referendum. The Scottish
Independence Referendum of 2014 brought new salience to the debate on giving
16 year olds the right to vote—they were allowed to in the UK for the first time
—as most exercised their newly-awarded franchise in that campaign and many
appeared to be politically engaged. The estimated turnout of 75% for 16 and
17 year olds compared to 54% of 18-24 year olds. It was unsurprising that, in the
weeks leading up to the unanticipated General Election of 2017, the intentions
and expected turnout of young people were closely scrutinised. Indeed, discrep-
ancies between pollsters’ forecasts were even largely attributed to the question of
whether young people would vote in as high numbers as they were promising.
This chapter examines the role of young people in the 2017 General Election.
In order to provide an insight into their perceptions and motivations, I look at
the specific context of this election for young people, and notably the implica-
tions of the Brexit result on the attitudes of young people leading up to the 8 June
Election. Using new survey data1 drawn from the responses of thousands of vot-
ers (young and old) I then explore the important role played by young voters in
the election, notably those aged 18-24, from the first indications regarding their
registration and turnout to the motivations behind their electoral choice, and the
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analysis of a number of cases where their mobilisation seemed to change the out-
come of a constituency vote. I assess the extent to which young people used their
vote to claim their electoral weight within the polity, their ability to shape their
future, but also to express a clear desire for change and significant levels of demo-
cratic frustration.
The challenge of engaging young people in politics has exercise all democra-
cies. Young citizens report particularly high levels of distrust of political systems,
institutions, and social elites, leading to claims of a contemporary ‘crisis of
democracy’ (see for example Newton, 2001; Mishler and Rose, 1997). A growing
sense of dissatisfaction towards political systems has been associated with young
people (Torcal and Montero, 2006). This has been accompanied by a distinct shift
away from many traditional modes of political participation, often evidenced by
low turnout in elections (LeDuc et al., 1996, 2002; Franklin, 2004) and the col-
lapse of membership levels of political parties and unions (Scarrow, 1996; Katz
and Mair, 1994; Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Whilst such trends are not confined
to young people, for this age group, the evidence is most acute. Specifically,
Norris et al. (2002) found that the participation of young voters has declined
across many democracies, and Henn et al. (2002) refer to a general trend of youth
disengagement from all forms of traditional political activity. Nonetheless, there
is ample debate concerning the interpretation of this decline in youth participa-
tion. Cammaerts et al. (2014, 2016), for instance, question the existence of wide-
spread youth apathy. They suggest instead that there is a genuine appetite for
involvement, underlining that young people insist that elections remain the key
to democratic participation but often feel the political offer fails to address their
concerns.
1. An unusual focus on the youth electorate: From the Brexit
Referendum to the General Election 2017
In the aftermath of the result of the Brexit Referendum, much debate ensued con-
cerning the participation and preferences of the youth electorate. Young people
were criticised initially for their low turnout in the Referendum. Participation
was reported to be only 46% for the 18-24-year-old electorate (Sky Data, 2016).
However, on closer inspection this figure of 46% was in fact an estimate based on
previous data concerning voting regularity in the 2015 election. Yet, we know
that young people are much less likely to be registered to vote. In July 2014, the
Electoral Commission confirmed that ‘younger people (under 35) are consider-
ably less likely to be registered’ with only 70.2% of 20-24 year olds present on
electoral registers, against 95.5% of 65þ year olds (UK Electoral Commission,
2014). Therefore, an estimation of turnout based on an overall proportion of the
total population can be misleading particularly in the case of young people.
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Allowing for low registration which has to be taken into account, turnout for the
younger population was in fact substantially higher than previously reported. It
was 64% for the 18-24 age group, only eight points below the national average.
Whilst still below that of older voters, turnout for young people was probably
closer to the national average than in any other national election in recent
memory.
Traditionally, when thinking of the fracture lines that have split the vote of the
British electorate over the years, the impact of social class (Butler and Stokes,
1974; Butler and Kavanagh, 2002), the North South divide (McMahon et al.,
1992) or the differences between cities and the country (Jennings and Stoker,
2017) have been considered as the most important cleavages in explaining voter
behaviour. However, the youth vote drew exceptional attention in the aftermath
of the 2016 Brexit Referendum. The result reflected a substantial generational
divide with an overwhelming majority of young people voting for the UK to
remain in the European Union (Skinner and Gottfried, 2017). The exposition of
a stark divergence between the preferences of young and older voters in relation
to Britain’s place within and relationship with the European Union is not a par-
ticularly new phenomenon. Indeed, it was previously highlighted by a series of
questions that we included in a survey which probed implicit and explicit associa-
tions with the EU (Bruter and Harrison, 2016). When asked to compare the EU
to an animal, older Brits chose a representation of an elephant, whilst younger
respondents preferred to associate the EU with a lion. When asked to compare
the EU to a painting, older Brits chose Guernica and the young a Dance by
Matisse. Similarly, when we asked for a human trait, the top answer amongst the
old was stupidity and amongst the young intelligence. The symbolism of these
contrasted visions should not be dismissed as they offer a real insight into the jux-
taposed visions that British citizens hold. These perceptions of the EU shed light
upon the divisions within British society and how differently the younger and
older generations perceive the EU. In line with this stronger sense of identity asso-
ciation with Europe and a stronger attachment to the cultural aspects of the
shared community, young people also showed higher levels of emotion in the
wake of the Referendum result. 46% of those aged 18-24 admitted to having tears
in their eyes when they discovered the result of the Referendum, and 51% felt
anger and 46% disgust at those who had voted differently from them (Bruter and
Harrison, 2017).
2. Registration and voting at the General Election
Efforts to increase voter registration were again prioritised during the run up to
the election in June 2017. An enthusiastic registration drive from social networks
including Facebook and Snapchat that encouraged their users to register to vote
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contributed to the efforts of getting more young people engaged. Similarly, cam-
paigns led by ‘Bite the Ballot’ and #TurnUp encouraged young voters to register
and to turnout on Election Day, echoed by contemporary musicians ranging
from Pink Floyd frontman David Gilmour to Grime artist JME. A website
‘mynearestmarginal.com’ also encouraged tactical voting from students suggest-
ing that they register at the address where their vote would count the most.
Furthermore, the Labour Party made explicit efforts to mobilise young voters by
implementing digital technology and media communication tools that targeted
specific messages to local electorates, and more notably by promising to abolish
university tuition fees should they form the next government.
The Cabinet Office reported that 246,000 young people under the age of 25
(compared to just 10,000 people over the age of 65) registered on the last possible
day before the general election. This was the first tangible indication that young
people’s stated intention to mobilise should be taken seriously by all involved in
the election. In addition, the question of whether the young would seek their
‘revenge’ after being marginalised in the Referendum was one of the most antici-
pated issues concerning the election. In this context, it is not surprising that
young people were seen as a potential target by some political parties and a threat
by others. Most parties from the so-called ‘progressive camp’ (Labour, Liberal-
Democrats, Greens, SNP) tried to address young people and the resentment that
many expressed over the Brexit result.
On election night, it soon became clear that young people’s promised mobili-
sation and coordinated effort to oppose the incumbent Government had gone
beyond everyone’s expectations in shaping the outcome of a hung parliament. As
Figure 16.1 shows, turnout (after controlling for registration) of 18-24 year olds
was a remarkably high 71%, which was not statistically significantly different
from that of the overall British population. This indeed suggested an unprece-
dented level of youth mobilisation in the General Election and amplified the pre-
vious record engagement of young people in the June 2016 EU membership
Referendum.
As the 2014, 2016 and 2017 contests illustrated, young people can be moti-
vated to participate when the stakes are perceived to be high. The emphasis on
optimistic plans and prognoses for the future seem to echo particularly well for
young people. In light of these various motivations that often underpin young
people’s choice of vote, we now turn to the specific details of the election result.
In terms of party choice, young voters aged 18-24 voted in higher numbers for
the Labour party (63% compared to 40% for the overall population) and much
less for the Conservative party (24% as opposed to 42% for the overall popula-
tion). Support for the Liberal Democrats amongst young people was higher in
some constituencies with large student populations, and in particular where the
Liberal Democrats were the main adversaries of the Conservatives. These results
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raise some critical questions. Was the youth vote predominantly a vote ‘for
Labour’ or ‘against the Tories’? Did it vary according to local context and battles?
And what were the key motivations behind it? Before turning our attention to the
electoral motivations of young voters and how they differed from those expressed
by the rest of the British population, we will now briefly examine a few key con-
stituencies where young voters—and notably students—represent a prominent
segment of the electorate to identify their effect at the local level.
3. Three key constituencies: Cardiff North, Sheffield Hallam, and
Oxford West
An interesting picture emerges when we look at the results from these three con-
stituencies with traditionally large populations of young people. At the local level,
large young and student populations typically benefited Labour, including against
the Liberal Democrats in Sheffield Hallam, but could also benefit other anti-
Conservative candidates, including the Liberal Democrats in constituencies such
as Oxford West, Eastbourne, Twickenham and Bath.
In 2015, Cardiff North was identified as one of the top ten constituencies with
the largest proportions of student population in the country, and one which
Labour critically needed to win. They failed to do so and the Conservatives
increased their majority to over 2,000. But in 2017 the fortunes of the two parties
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Figure 16.1. Turnout by age amongst registered voters in the 2016 EU referendum and the
2017 General Election.
Sources: Please see Note 1.
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Hallam has been in the spotlight for several consecutive elections as the seat of
former Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg. In a constituency where a very large
number of students from two different universities vote, Clegg surprisingly
resisted the Liberal Democrat collapse of 2015 to hang on to his seat. However, in
2017 the former leader, who broke his promise to scrap tuition fees at the outset
of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, finally lost his seat. Nonetheless,
the outcome of the Oxford West and Abingdon constituency, another student-
heavy Parliamentary seat, illustrated that the punishment for the broken promise
on tuition fees did not preclude Liberal Democrat success. Their victory over the
Conservatives with a swing of 9% and a majority of 816 owed something to
young people being keen to support whichever member of the ‘progressive block’
might defeat the Conservative incumbent who had held the seat since 2010. This
mobilisation of young voters rallying behind a Liberal Democrat primary con-
tender against a Conservative incumbent in that student-heavy constituency was
reminiscent of other similar marginal seats such as Twickenham and Bath (both
seats were taken from the Conservatives).
The electoral results of these three constituencies (where the weight of the
youth vote was substantial) raise important questions regarding the motivations
underpinning the preferences of young citizens who voted. Why did young peo-
ple choose to mobilise so much more than usual and why did they vote the way
they did and what did they try to achieve? The next section explores the motiva-
tions behind the youth vote by examining the responses to a selection of ques-
tions from our survey conducted in the aftermath of the election.
4. Motivations of the youth vote: Desire for change and a rejection
of ‘hard Brexit’
Whilst the youth vote was clearly far more important than most commentators
had expected, and whilst it clearly benefited Labour and in some specific cases the
Liberal Democrats, a number of possible hypotheses can be offered to understand
what motivated the electoral choice of the young. A first possibility is that the
young were seduced by specific policies proposed by the Labour Party, notably
the abolition of tuition fees directly targeted towards the young electorate. This is
particularly relevant as the Conservative Party failed to address the preferences of
the young electorate and largely underestimated their weight in the result. Whilst
the Conservative Party failed to address young people in their manifesto, in con-
trast, young voters may have been indeed seduced by the personality and direct
appeals of the Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn. Yet the Labour Party had accepted
the result of Brexit and pledged to implement the democratic decision of the vot-
ers, an acquiescence regarding the result which perhaps ought to have disap-
pointed most young people. The election was perceived as an opportunity for
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young people to express their discontent about the Brexit result and their frustra-
tion towards the way politics is conducted.
To arbitrate between those conflicting explanations, we asked respondents
about the specific motivations underpinning their choice of vote. These motiva-
tions included all of the following: the wish to express their frustration at the cur-
rent political situation; the desire to express their enthusiasm for the programme
of the party that they chose; the desire to position themselves against a version of
Brexit that would be unacceptable to them; the wish to express their enthusiasm
at the leader of the party they voted for; a vote for change; a vote for stability; or a
desire to be better represented even if it did not influence who governed the
country. On the whole, all of those motivations proved highly relevant to young
citizens and the population in general alike. However, the most interesting find-
ing concerns the nature of the differences between the prominence of given moti-
vations for 18-24 year olds as compared to the rest of the sample.
Four key reasons provided the main motivations uniquely characteristic of the
youth vote: (i) the expression of democratic frustration; (ii) the positioning
against Brexit; (iii) the desire for change; (iv) and the support for the party pro-
gramme. By contrast, enthusiasm for the party leader, stability, and representa-
tion were not significantly higher amongst young people compared to their older
counterparts. These findings and the comparison with other voters are summar-
ised in Table 16.1.
Specifically, young voters were found to be 16% more likely to be motivated
by a desire for change than the average voter; 12% more likely to use their vote to
express their opposition to a certain vision of Brexit; 11% more likely to express
frustration at the current political situation; and 11% more likely than the average
voter to express their support for the programme of the party that they voted for.
All four of those motivations were mentioned by over 80% of young people aged
Table 16.1 Differentials in voting motivations of 18-24 year olds compared to other voters,
2017 General Election
Electoral Choice Motivation Differential (young-average)
Desire for change þ16
Opposition to form of Brexit þ12
Frustration þ11
Support for party programme þ11
Support for party leader þ6
Representation þ1
Stability 0
Sources: Please see Note 1.
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18-24. By contrast, there was no major difference between respondents aged 18-
24 and the rest of the population when expressing the desire for stability, better
representation, or expressing enthusiasm for the leader of the party they voted
for, all of which were largely in line with the answers of the rest of the population.
It is noteworthy that in contrast to the prominent narrative in the media in the
aftermath of the election, the personality of the party leader does not seem to be a
notably higher motivation for young people compared to the rest of the
population.
The most striking aspect of these findings is that they highlight the specificity
of motivations amongst young people, in particular those with a negative conno-
tation. Indeed, the first three motivations for vote choice were: (i) desire for
change, including a rejection and negation of the status quo expressed as a direct
desire to depart from the existing politics; (ii) strong opposition to the Brexit
process and the necessary changes that it would bring in terms of the reformula-
tion of vision and identity of the UK; and (iii) a sense of frustration with the cur-
rent political situation. Insights gained from additional qualitative details
provided by young voters themselves highlighted that the desire for change also
included negativity towards the introduction of widespread austerity measures
(of which young people were often seen as the victims), and the desire to express
support for party programmes and policies with prominent references to youth-
specific measures such as the promised abolition of tuition fees, which became a
central part of the Labour manifesto during the campaign.
In summary, the motivations expressed by young voters seem to encapsulate
their desire to oppose a certain direction and vision for the future of the UK. This
sense of negativity expressed towards the political system is also illustrated by
findings that confirm differences in levels of frustration between younger and
older age groups, as Table 16.2 shows. Overall, 18-24 year olds claim to experi-
ence significantly higher levels of frustration with the democratic system than
people aged 25 and over. The largest differences between younger and older citi-
zens concern frustration towards the political system. Within the indices, items
that were particularly salient within the dominant political dimension were, for
example, the perception that politicians do not fight for the socio-tropic interest
but only for their own, the feeling of not being listened to, and the lack of long-
term vision from politicians. These three items featured in the highest difference
of means between the young and older age groups. Whilst lower differences
existed between younger and older voters for frustration expressed towards the
institutional framework such as the criticism concerning the absence of demo-
cratic involvement for all citizens. In terms of ideological frustration, young peo-
ple reported that the existing political offer does not truly correspond to their
true preferences.
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This insidious feeling of frustration also tainted young people’s perceptions of
the atmosphere of the General Election. When asked to characterise the atmos-
phere of the campaign election, the main adjectives mentioned by young people
aged 18-24 were tense (38%), democratic (31%), aggressive (28%) and fractious
(27%). By contrast, only 9% of young citizens described the atmosphere of the
election as constructive and only 8% as respectful. Even more importantly, how-
ever, when asked how they felt towards people who voted differently from them,
young people felt more hostility than the rest of the population. While 71%
expressed anger at people who voted for the party they liked least (in contrast to
45% for the national average), 75% expressed frustration (versus 62%), 66%
expressed distrust (versus 57%), and 57% even described feeling some disgust
towards those people who voted for the party that they liked least (versus 44%).
This persistence of negative feelings towards what is perceived as an opposing
part of the electorate is critical, not only because it emphases how politically iso-
lated many of the young feel in British society, but also because it is, in all likeli-
hood, one of the main factors that led to a much higher mobilisation of the
young than originally expected: to ensure their voice would no longer be
unheard. Such inter-generational hostility may not necessarily be seen as healthy
for the polity.
5. Conclusion: A ‘youthquake’?
When the 2017 General Election was announced, many observers expected that
young voters would be largely irrelevant to the final outcome of the election due
to their lack of enthusiasm for politics, accompanied by poor mobilisation and
perennial low levels of turnout in elections. Instead, young people became possi-
bly the most featured demographic group of the election. Turnout rose to a level
Table 16.2 Frustration indices amongst young and older voters in the 2017 General Election
Frustration Indices 18-24 25 and over Difference
Political 53.9 (27.9) 50.1 (28.1) þ3.8
Absence of socio-tropic interest 59.2 (31.6) 52.5 (31.8) þ6.7
Not listened to 53.0 (28.7) 49.1 (30.2) þ3.9
Lack of long-term vision 52.2 (29.9) 48.5 (30.1) þ3.7
Institutional 45.4 (26.1) 43.2 (26.6) þ2.2
Lack of inclusive democracy 43.7 (27.6) 40.2 (27.5) þ3.5
Ideological 44.2 (26.6) 41.8 (24.9) þ2.4
Lack of political offer 46.4 (28.4) 42.5 (28.0) þ3.9
Overall 48.9 (25.5) 45.9 (25.2) 13.0
Sources: Please see Note 1.
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not hugely different from those of the overall population, and the youth vote con-
tributed to the denial of a Conservative overall majority. Young voters were keen
to express their desire for change, demonstrate opposition to Brexit a year after
the Referendum, and indicate frustration at the perceived current political situa-
tion. Yet the extent of youth support for Labour, a party committed to Brexit,
indicated disjuncture between the ambitions of many and the willingness of their
electoral choice to articulate their political position.
The General Election showed that young people are not disengaged from
political debate. Young people, perhaps more so than any than other age cate-
gory, have ideals and aspirations about what democracy should be and how their
political system should deliver those expectations. It is clear from their discourse
that they are eager to hear messages of positive transformation and are willing to
support ambitions that will help create solidarity and social cohesion. Many
young people tend to be suspicious of elites and politicians, yet they find it easier
to get passionate about an issue than they do about a party. In this context, we
witnessed high turnout among 18-24 year olds in the Brexit Referendum.
Our findings reveal that young voters—those between the ages of 18 and 24
years old—were significantly more motivated by a desire for change, a rejection
of the vision of Brexit promoted by the Government and frustration with the cur-
rent political climate than the rest of the voting population. It is clear that Brexit
has left many young people feeling marginalised and that their identity has been
redefined by older generations. They decided to embrace the next available
opportunity to have their voice heard and try to correct the trajectory of a future
which the Brexit vote had made so divergent from their own overwhelming
preference—whatever the illogicality of supporting Labour in this context. The
perception that Labour might offer a softer Brexit or even reverse the exit policy
may have prevailed. The question begged is whether the referendum-based
engagement, sustained in a Brexit-dominated election, will be maintained in
future elections. The current level of political turmoil suggests the answer is prob-
ably yes.
References
Bruter, M. and Harrison, S. (2012) How European Do You Feel? The Psychology of
European Identity. Report published in collaboration with Opinium Research and
Lansons Communications, accessed at http://opinium.co.uk/how-european-do-you-
feel/ on 19 July 2017.
Bruter, M. and Harrison, S. (2016) Impact of Brexit on Consumer Behaviour, accessed at
http://opinium.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/the_impact_of_brexit_on_con
sumer_behaviour_0.pdf on 23 September 2017.
264 Britain Votes 2017
Bruter, M. and Harrison, S. (2017) ‘Understanding the Emotional Act of Voting’, Nature:
Human Behaviour, 1, 1–3.
Butler, D. and Stokes, D. (1974) Electoral Change in Britain, London, Macmillan.
Butler, D. and Kavanagh, D. (2002) The British General Election of 2001, Basingstoke,
Palgrave.
Cammaerts, B., Bruter, M., Banaji, S., Harrison, S. and Anstead, N. (2016) Youth
Participation in Europe: In Between Hope and Disillusion, Basingstoke, Palgrave.
Cammaerts, B., Bruter, M., Banaji, S., Harrison, S. and Anstead, N. (2014) ‘The Myth of
Youth Apathy: Young Europeans’ Critical Attitudes Toward Democratic Life, American
Behavioral Scientist, 58, 645–664.
Electoral Commission (2014) The Quality of the 2014 Electoral Register, accessed at http://
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/169889/Completeness-
and-accuracy-of-the-2014-electoral-registers-in-Great-Britain.pdf on 29 September
2017.
Franklin, M. N. (2004) Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in
Established Democracies since 1945, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Henn, M., Weinstein, M. and Wring, D. (2002) ‘A Generation Apart? Youth and Political
Participation in Britain’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 4,
167–192.
Jennings, W. and Stoker, G. (2017) ‘Tilting Towards the Cosmopolitan Axis? Political
Change in England and the 2017 General Election’, The Political Quarterly, 88,
359–369.
Katz, P. and Mair, P. (1994) How Parties Organise, London, Sage.
LeDuc, L., Niemi, R. and Norris, P. (eds) (1996) Comparing Democracies: Elections and
Voting in Global Perspective, London, Sage.
McMahon, D., Heath, A., Harrop, M. and Curtice, J. (1992) ‘The Electoral Consequences
of North-South Migration’, British Journal of Political Science, 22, 419–443.
Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (1997) ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Population Evaluations
of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-communist Societies, The Journal of Politics,
59, 418–451.
Newton, K. (2001) ‘Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy’, International
Political Science Review, 22, 201–214.
Norris, P., Niemi, R. G. and LeDuc, L. (eds) (2002) Comparing Democracies 2: New
Challenges in the Study of Slections and Voting, London, Sage.
Pharr S. and Putnam, R. (eds) (2000) Disaffected Democracies? What’s Troubling the
Trilateral Countries?, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Scarrow, S. (1996) Parties and Their Members, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Skinner, G. (2015) How Britain Voted in 2015, IPSOSMori, accessed at https://www.ipsos.
com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/how-britain-voted-2015 on 23 September 2017.
Young Voters 265
Skinner, G. and Gottfried, G. (2017) How Britain Voted in the 2016 EU Referendum,
accessed at https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/how-britain-voted-2016-eu-refer
endum on 23 September 2017.
Sky Data (2016) accessed at https://twitter.com/SkyData/status/746700869656256512 on
23 September 2017.
Torcal, M. (2006) ‘Political Disaffection and Democratization History in New
Democracies’. In Torcal, M. and Montero, J. M. (eds) Political Disaffection in
Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics, London, Routledge,
pp. 157–189.
Van der Eijk, C. and Franklin, M. (2009) Elections and Voters, Basingstoke, Palgrave
Macmillan
Van der Eijk, C. and Franklin, M. N. (1996) Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and
National Politics in the Face of Union, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press.
266 Britain Votes 2017
